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INTRODUCTION
Since 1967, an average of 50,000 men each year have been ad-
ministratively discharged from the armed services, as compared
with an average of roughly 4,000 discharged annually as a result
of courts-martial.1 Many of those administratively discharged
were homosexuals, many were drug users, many shirked their
military duties, some failed to pay their legal debts, and others
were simply unsanitary.
Of those discharged administratively, roughly 25% were labelled
as "undesirable" and were returned to a civilian society to face
family, friends, and prospective employers with that stigma.
2
They found, too, that they were ineligible for veterans' benefits to
continue their schooling, or buy a new home, or if so inclined, to
begin flying lessons.
* United States Senator, North Carolina; Chairman, Senate Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights. The author wishes to acknowledge the
valuable assistance of Lewis B. Snider, LL.B. University of Virginia Law
School, 1969, Assistant Counsel to the Subcommittee, in the preparation
of this article.
1. Hearings on H.R. 523 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Armed
Services Committee, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5868-5869 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as 1971 Hearings].
2. Id. at 5868.
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The armed services have long reserved the right to discharge
administratively any individual who, for one reason or another,
cannot measure up to accepted standards of performance,
whether or not that failure involves conduct subject to trial by
courts-martial. Such discharges are processed in accordance with
regulations drawn by the services, enforced by the services, and
reviewed by the services. If there are abuses, they typically are
not challenged judicially.3 But they have not gone unnoticed.
The Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights began its study of
administrative discharges in 1961 in response to an increasing
number of complaints that the system was unfair and left an ir-
reparable stigma on those it affected. Exploratory hearings were
conducted in 19624 and more extensive hearings were held in 1966.5
Several legislative proposals grew out of these hearings; however,
no bills dealing with this subject have as yet become law.
Meanwhile, letters from discharged servicemen unable to find
jobs, from those who cannot get the job they desire, and from
those who wanted a military career but were returned to a civilian
world with little marketable experience continue to reach the sub-
committee. Their common complaint is that the administrative
discharge system has unfairly condemned them to an inferior con-
dition-whether it be in terms of a job or simply the respect of
their family and friends-in violation of theix constitutional
right to due process under the law.
Those who defend our rights must not be the only citizens who
are denied their protections and, as a consequence, are returned to
a civilian world that holds little promise for them. We must not
ignore those servicemen who are daily eliminated in administra-
five settings which accord less than what the due process clause of
the fifth amendment guarantees and less than what we owe those
who are prepared to give their lives to safeguard our freedoms
and our rights.
3. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam) and Beard
v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962) (per curiam) as examples of judicial challenges
to discharge procedures. Also, a general discussion of judicial review of
military determinations can be found in Sherman, Judicial Review of Mili-
tary Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA.
L.R nv. 483 (1969).
4. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel Before
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings].
5. Joint Hearings on Military Justice Before the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights and a Special Subcommittee of the Armed Services
Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings].
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THE EXISTING FRAMWMWORK
Chapter 59 of Title 10, United States Code, provides for separa-
tion of servicemen prior to the expiration of their term of service
by reason of a sentence of court-martial or in accordance with the
regulations of the Secretary concerned. 6
Service regulations provide for five types of discharges which
implement the general language of Chapter 59--dishonorable, bad
conduct, undesirable, general, and honorable. The first two are
given only as a result of a sentence of courts-martial. 7 The latter
three are awarded as an administrative act of separation, which
may or may not have been directed by an administrative
board. The services further distinguish these categories by des-
ignating the first two as "punitive," and the latter three as non-
punitive, or simply administrative.
Not until 1959 was there a Defense Department directive dealing
with administrative discharges.8 Even then it provided uniformity
only with respect to the grounds upon which separation could be
based. The services by and large were left with the discharge
procedures which had evolved through decades of use. In 1965,
largely in response to the subcommittee's hearings, a revision
of the basic directive did provide substantial uniformity both in
terms of substantive grounds and the procedural processing of ad-
ministrative discharges.9 It established minimum standards to gov-
ern such action, but left each service room to tailor its system to
its own views and, if the service felt it desirable, to provide for
more stringent procedures. The directive, with certain minor
changes, remains the authority upon which administrative dis-
charges are currently based.
The directive provides that such discharges may be given for
unsuitability, unfitness, misconduct, and in the interest of na-
tional security. These categories are broken down still further.10
6. 10 U.S.C. § 1169 (1970).
7. See generally, MANuAL FOR COumTS-MARTL, para. 126 (rev. ed.
1969). Officers do not receive dishonorable discharges but can be dis-
missed by a general court-martial. Similarly, officers do not receive bad
conduct discharges, but are subject to discharge as undesirable.
8. DoD Directive 1332.14, Administrative Discharges, January 14, 1959.
9. DoD Directive 1332.14, Administrative Discharges, December 20, 1965.
10. Id.
G. Unsuitability. Discharge by reason of unsuitability, with an
Honorable or General Discharge as warranted by the indi-
Those discharged for unsuitability may receive only an honorable
vidual's military record. Such discharge may be effected when
it has been determined that an individual is unsuitable for
further military service because of:
1. Inaptitude: Applicable to those persons who are best de-
scribed as inapt due to lack of general adaptability, want
of readiness of skill, unhandiness, or inability to learn.
2. Character and Behavior Disorders.
3. Apathy, defective attitudes, and inability to expend effort
constructively: As a significant observable defect, apparent-




6. Homosexuality and other aberrant tendencies.
7. Financial Irresponsibility.
R. Security. Discharge, with the character of discharge and under
conditions and procedures stipulated by the Secretary of De-
fense as set forth in reference (c) which deals explicitly with
this matter, when retention is not clearly consistent with the
interest of national security.
L Unfitness. Discharges by reason of unfitness, with an Unde-
sirable Discharge, unless the particular circumstances, in a
given case warrant a General or Honorable Discharge, when an
individual's military record in his current enlistment or period
of obligated service includes one or more of the following:
1. Frequent involvement of a discreditable nature with civil
or military authorities.
2. Sexual perversion including but not limited to (1) lewd
and lascivious acts, (2) homosexual acts, (3) sodomy,
(4) indecent exposure, (5) indecent acts with or assault
upon a child, or (6) other indecent acts or offenses.
3. Drug abuse as defined in DoD Directive 1300.11.
4. An established pattern for shirking.
5. An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to pay
just debts.
6. An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to con-
tribute adequate support to dependents or failure to comply
with orders, decrees, or judgments of a civil court concern-
ing support of dependents.
7. Unsanitary habits.
J. Misconduct. Discharge by reason of misconduct, with an Un-
desirable Discharge, unless the particular circumstances in a
given case warrant a more favorable discharge, when one or
more of the following conditions have been determined:
1. Conviction by civil authorities (foreign or domestic) or ac-
tion taken which is tantamount to a finding of guilty of an
offense for which the maximum penalty under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice is death or confinement in excess
of one year; or which involves moral turpitude; or where
the offender is adjudged a juvenile delinquent, wayward
minor, or youthful offender or is placed on probation or
punished in any way as the result of an offense involving
moral turpitude. If the offense is not listed in the MCM
Table of Maximum Punishments or is not closely related
to an offense listed therein, the maximum punishments au-
thorized by the U.S. Code or the District of Columbia Code,
whichever is lesser, applies.
2. Procurement of a fraudulent enlistment, induction or period
of active service through any deliberate material misrep-
resentation, omission or concealment which if known at
the time might have resulted in rejection.
3. Prolonged unauthorized absence. When unauthorized con-
-tinuous absence of one year or more has been "estab-
lished."
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or a general discharge, depending upon the character of their
service record. Both discharges are considered "under honorable
conditions." Those discharged on grounds of unfitness, misconduct,
and security, however, may receive undesirable discharges, as well
as honorable and general, again depending on the character of
their service.
An undesirable discharge, which is administrative, carries with
it the same loss of veterans' benefits as a bad conduct discharge,
which is punitive. While there may be disagreement as to which
carries the greater stigma,11 it is undisputed that being labelled an
"undesirable" is a considerable obstacle to reckon with in one's
future.12  Retired Commander Penrose L. Albright, former presi-
dent of the Judge Advocates Association, has called the undesir-
able discharge "the scarlet letter of this generation" 13 and, indeed,
it is a brand which is likely to repulse employers and friends
alike. Where the harm is so potentially devastating, it is impera-
tive that undesirable discharges be bestowed only pursuant to a
system which is characterized by our traditional notions of due
process.
Honorable and general discharges, in contrast to the "undesir-
able," are both considered as discharges "under honorable condi-
tions" and entitle their recipients to the same veterans' benefits.
The directive provides that those separated for unsuitability (who
11. Statement of Maj. Gen. James S. Cheney, Judge Advocate General,
Air Force, 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5900: "I think you have to say
legally the bad conduct discharge is more serious than the undesirable.
The practical effects is [sic] something else." See also Id. at 5899, 5967;
1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 188, 328; 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 293,
335.
12. Former Congressman Clyde Doyle, 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at
328:
[If a man is undesirable,] you don't want anything to do with
him. You don't go into detail to find out what makes him un-
desirable. You think he may be a thief, he may be a homosexual,
he may not be supporting his children, his family in the minds of
some people, but he is undesirable, you don't want him around.
And I think the ordinary patriotic, sound-thinking American citi-
zen doesn't want to have anything to do with an undesirable man
and that applies to an undesirable man from the military. Some-
thing has occurred there in the military for which he has gotten
an undesirable discharge. It is a stigma. It is a liability and a
heavy one.
See also 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5835.
13. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 411.
can at most receive only a "general" discharge) do not have a right
to a board hearing unless they have more than eight years of serv-
ice experience,14 while others facing separation for unfitness or
misconduct do have such a right regardless of service experience.
The Defense Department contends that since a general discharge
is under honorable conditions and does not deprive a serviceman of
veterans' benefits, it need not be awarded under the same protec-
tions as the undesirable discharge which does result in loss of bene-
fits. This is not persuasive. There is an implied stigma which at-
taches to any discharge other than one labelled as fully "honor-
able."'15 This is due in part to the fact that 97% of all discharges
are indeed honorable.16 The public understandably reasons that
there must be some defect in an individual who fails to obtain
one.17 It is interesting to note that despite the provision in the
DOD directive, the Army and to a lesser degree the Air Force both
permit a board hearing in cases of unsuitability even though a
general discharge is the worst that can be recommended.18 These
services properly recognize that even a general discharge brings
with it certain opprobrium.19
Because servicemen facing administrative discharges receive dif-
ferent protections according to the particular branch of service
which they happen to be part of, legislation is needed not only to
bring discharge procedures up to a higher standard of procedural
due process, but also to provide uniformity of protection to all
servicemen regardless of the branch to which they belong. Uni-
formity is desirable not simply for uniformity's sake. To accord a
Navy seaman certain rights and not accord them to an Army pri-
vate facing discharge on the same grounds raises a constitutional,
if not a moral, question of equal protection among servicemen.
While Defense Department directives do provide some uniformity
and are obviously more desirable than no guidance at all, they are
14. DoD Directive 1332.14, Section VIII(C) (1965).
15. The Department of the Air Force itself acknowledges that a "general
discharge has been found to be a definite disadvantage to an airman seeking
civilian employment." AFR 39-10, para. 8a (March 17, 1959). See also:
1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 341; 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5983,
5988; Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
16. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5870.
17. Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings,
1966 DUxE L.J. 44.
18. Army Regulation 635-212, § IV(10) (15 July 1966).
19. General discharge certificates, as all discharge certificates, are anno-
tated with "separation program numbers" which indicate the reason for
discharge. Employers who are aware of the codes would thus be informed
of the reason for discharge even though it is not evident from the term
"general."
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subject to change at the whim of the Department, whose interests
must be weighted towards operational efficiency rather than jus-
tice for the individual.
Two bills dealing with administrative discharges are currently
pending before the Senate Armed Services Committee. One is
H.R. 10422, introduced by Congressman Charles E. Bennett of
Florida and passed by the House of Representatives on October 6,
1971. The other is S. 2247 which I proposed on July 12, 1971, during
the last session of Congress. The Bennett bill deals with admin-
istrative discharges on a broader, more general level than does S.
2247, which constitutes a comprehensive and detailed legislative
framework within which to deal with the problem. In order to
evaluate critically what each bill attempts to do, it is first neces-
sary to discuss the different philosophies regarding the role of the
administrative discharge in a system of military justice and mili-
tary personnel administration.
THE ROLE OF THE ADm'ulmSTRAIvE DISCHARGE
Position of the Military
The military prefers to regard the administrative discharge as a
purely administrative act.20 It is seen as a tool through which the
services can rid themselves of undesirable members prior to the
expiration of their terms of service. The military points to the re-
duced efficiency entailed by maintaining in the services those
with "two left feet" who, try as they might, cannot meet mini-
mum standards of performance, and those who are continually
involved in misconduct which, whether serious or not, requires
inordinate amounts of supervision and discipline.2 1 It also points
to the erosion of discipline and morale among its hard-working
members by retaining "troublemakers" after repeated misconduct,
whether they be homosexuals or shirkers.22
20. Statement of Maj. Gen. Leo E. Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at
5865: "In the case of undesirable discharges which have been given for
security, unfitness, and misconduct, we believe that this is an administra-
tive procedure. It does not carry with it the punitive aspects of a dis-
honorable or bad conduct discharge." See also, 1966 Hearings, supra note
5, at 356.
21. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 356.
22. Id. at 360.
Given the alleged harm to military efficiency and morale which
the retention of undesirable members entails, the military insists
that it needs a simple, expeditious means to separate them.23 The
value of a separation to the military thus decreases in inverse pro-
portion to the length of time required for the process since the
individual remains to cause problems.
These justifications for administrative discharges are understand-
able and might well serve as sound principles for any course in
personnel management. Yet the matter does not end here. The
military claims that the administrative discharge should not be
considered as punishment for misconduct.24 It is only a determi-
nation, claim the services, that a serviceman's record does not
merit his retention. But despite the claim that administrative
discharges are not punishment, the administrative board, in effect,
places a sanction on acts of misconduct. It freely considers evidence
of misconduct, established in no other judicial or quasi-judicial
setting, and may issue an undesirable discharge resulting in the
loss of substantial veterans' benefits and the lifelong burden of the
"undesirable" stigma.25
Regardless of the punitive consequences of the administrative
proceeding, the military insists upon its right to consider miscon-
duct in a setting which accords less than what is required by tradi-
tional notions of due process, and further insists on its right to
characterize resulting discharges as "undesirable".
If military insistence on either of these conditions-the consid-
eration of conduct not established in a judicial setting or the char-
acterization of discharges as undesirable-were dropped, the ad-
ministrative discharge proceeding would become far less objection-
able in terms of the way in which it is conducted and the harm it
does to the individual. The services' insistence on these two points
thus requires some further critical comment.
Characterization of Discharges
Several witnesses at the 1966 hearings raised the possibility of
altering or doing away with the present system of characterizing
23. Id.
24. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5835, 5836; 1966 Hearings, supra note
5, at 87.
25. Statement of Maj. Gen. Kenneth J. Hodson, formerly Assistant Judge
Advocate General, Army, 1966 Hearings at 388:
The unfit, the unsuitable, should be separated from the military
service.... The only problem we have is how do we character-
ize his service. It is the position of the Department of De-
fense that we should be allowed to characterize a man's service
as either honorable, general, or undesirable by an administrative
proceeding.
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discharges.28 This idea has been seriously considered from time to
time by the services as well, but it has never been formally
adopted. Although the suggestions varied, their common purpose
was the elimination of the "undesirable" characterization. Such an
alternative would not purify the administrative discharge proce-
dures to the satisfaction of a constitutional stickler, but the fact
that the stigma which an undesirable discharge entails might be
dissipated would make the procedures more palatable because its
sting would be removed.
Military spokesmen have justified characterizing discharges in
terms of providing an incentive for "honorable" service and a de-
terrent for "undesirable" service.2 7  One of the greatest recogni-
tions that a man can obtain, claim the services, is an "honorable"
discharge, and it is a notion which the American public generally
seems to accept. But since roughly 97% of servicemen receive
"honorable" discharges, the real mark of distinction is not being
among those who fail to obtain one. Granting the military's posi-
tion, the question is whether a system can be devised which pro-
vides an incentive for honorable service and yet leaves no stigma
on those who are administratively separated.
Eliminating the "undesirable" category would have the virtue of
eliminating the repugnant connotations of the word "undesirable"
but it might well mean that once the public becomes generally
aware of the change, the stigma would only shift to recipients of
the general discharge. There is evidence even now of a stigma
attaching to a general discharge since it is not precisely an "honor-
able" one.
28
Another possibility would be simply to have one category of
"honorable' or another more neutral term to describe an adminis-
26. 1966 Hearings at 119-122, 130, 209-210, 423.
27. Statement of Maj. Gen. Leo E. Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5866:
The trouble with it [eliminating a characterization of discharges]
is that it lowers the prestige. It diminishes the value of the dis-
charge to the man who has given honorable service. You need a
way to characterize the service for what it truly is. To lump them
all together into one discharge, an honorable discharge, or what-
ever terms would apply to it, you would have no way of distin-
guishing or recognizing the man who has really performed his
service honorably.
See also, 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 88.
28. See note 15, supra.
trative discharge. But while this would eliminate the stigma, it
would not provide the incentive for service that the honorable
discharge affords-again, assuming the validity of that claim.
A third possibility would be to use a less colorful term than
"undesirable" since that term conjures up all sorts of perverse
traits and defects. An "unsatisfactory performance" discharge
would be an example. This alternative might possibly prevent
some of the abhorrence evoked by the adjective "undesirable," but
it would still leave the recipient with a damaging label carried
over to civilian life.
Compounding the problem of characterization is the matter of
veterans' benefits, which attach only at the completion of "honor-
able" service. The award of benefits militates against a system
having only one category of administrative discharge. If it is
agreed that benefits should not go to one who has not earned
them, and there were only one category of discharge, some system
would have to be devised to separate the recipients from the non-
recipients. In a system having only honorable and general dis-
charges, veterans' benefits might attach only to honorable and not
to general. This would, however, represent a change in the present
structure which accords benefits to recipients of general discharges
and, thus, may cause substantial headaches in terms of retroac-
tive effect for the Veterans Administration.
In conclusion, there seems to be no completely satisfactory way
to recharacterize discharges which effectively avoids the stigma
effect and yet preserves the status of the discharge as an incentive
to honorable service, and the consequent award of veterans' bene-
fits.
If, then, the military is to continue to discharge servicemen as
"undesirable," at least we must insure that such an onus is be-
stowed only in accordance with traditional notions of due process.
One way this might theoretically be accomplished is to permit mis-
conduct to be considered only in a judicial setting which al-
ready incorporates such safeguards, i.e., by courts-martial. But
to have such a situation, the grounds for discharge must be brought
under the Uniform Code. On this point, the military demurs on
the grounds that such action is neither possible nor appropriate.
"Judicializing" Administrative Discharges
A serviceman who continually refuses to complete his assigned
tasks could theoretically find himself facing a court-martial for
failing to obey an order, or an administrative discharge for shirk-
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ing.20 In a proceeding brought under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (either non-judicial punishment or a court-martial), the
likelihood of a discharge for such an offense is remote, while if the
conduct were considered administratively, the likelihood of dis-
charge is almost guaranteed. What is more important, in the ad-
ministrative proceeding the serviceman finds himself immersed in
a procedure which falls short of fully guaranteeing traditional
rights of due process, rights which are for the most part incor-
porated into courts-martial procedures. At present, a commander
theoretically has absolute discretion to choose either avenue to
treat the offending conduct. The arbitrary use of this discretion
might well be adjudged a violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 30 In fact, the subcommittee continually re-
ceives cases in which commanders have successfully recommended
administrative separation when conviction and discharge by a
court-martial would have been uncertain because of difficulties in
meeting the legal requirements of the Uniform Code. The use of
administrative process to avoid the strictures of the Code has been
a perennial problem ever since the Code was enacted.
3 1
The military contends that not all conduct which may be
grounds for administrative discharge can be brought under the pro-
visions of the Code (and consequently be subject to a court-martial
or non-judicial punishment), and therefore the administrative
route is a necessary alternative. 32 They point specifically to
homosexual acts and drug abuse as examples of conduct which
are claimed not to be punishable under the Code.33 Furthermore,
most of the grounds for administrative discharge, says the
military, are concerned with "patterns" of conduct rather than
single acts of misconduct, and there is nothing in the Code that
effectively allows a commander to deal with repeated instances
of misconduct.3 4 The military is on shaky ground with both of
29. See note 10, supra.
30. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5864.
31. In 1960 the judges of the Court of Military Appeals warned against
this method of subverting the Code in their annual report. S. 2247
would resolve the problem by prohibiting an administrative discharge
based on grounds which amount to a violation of the Uniform Code. See
§ 943 (b).
32. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 361-80.
33. Id. at 367-71.
34. Id. at 365.
these contentions. Whatever difficulty there may be in "pigeon-
holing" grounds for discharge as undesirable into the punitive
articles of the Uniform Code is largely semantic. They might be
included simply by amending the articles or perhaps by expanding
the grounds of Article 134 in the Manual for Courts-Martial, which
makes punishable "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a na-
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces." The issue is not
simply whether it can be done, but whether it should be done.
The military contends that even if all conduct which constitutes
grounds for administrative discharge could be brought under
the Code, it would be either inappropriate or ineffective, or both, to
do so. Their reasoning takes three primary tacks:35
First of all, the military claims that even if misconduct is re-
peatedly punished under the Code, a discharge-either a bad con-
duct or dishonorable-is highly unlikely to ensue in the vast ma-
jority of cases, and thus the serviceman will return to his duties
with no more than a fine or reduction in rank.86 Without a lib-
eralization of the award of a bad conduct discharge at courts-
martial, the services contend they would have virtually3 7 no
means of ridding themselves of undesirable personnel by sentence
of courts-martial.
Second, to discharge only through courts-martial would also
mean that in order for the services to consider discharge for
conduct which has been the subject of civil court conviction, the
serviceman would have to be tried twice for the same offense,
which runs afoul of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. 8 The holding in O'Callahan v. Parker,5 which prohibits
military trial of acts which were not "service-connected," also mili-
35. The military contends with less justification that all misconduct
should not be brought under the Code because some misconduct-homo-
sexual acts, for example-typically cannot be proved by evidence ad-
missible in a court-martial. They further add that some acts of miscon-
duct which form a basis for discharge do not involve moral turpitude, but
represent only an inordinate expenditure of administrative time, and
therefore, a court-martial from which a federal conviction may issue, is
an inappropriate and possibly too severe alternative. See generally, 1966
Hearings, supra note 5, at 360-80.
36. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 84, 362.
37. Article 127 (c) (B) of the Manual for Courts-Martial provides that a
court-martial may authorize as an additional punishment a bad conduct
discharge to servicemen who have two prior court-martial convictions on
their record. The use of this provision is discouraged, however, unless the
prior convictions have been for serious misconduct. Id. § 76a.
38. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 84.
39. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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tates against trial by courts-martial for misconduct committed
outside of military control. Yet the military feels it must have the
means to discharge servicemen convicted by civil courts who must
serve long prison sentences or who have brought substantial dis-
credit upon their service.
Finally, discharge by court-martial, where a bad conduct dis-
charge is issued, also requires review by a Court of Military Re-
view under the present regulations and possibly also by the Court
of Military Appeals. Furthermore, the trial process itself requires
a substantial amount of time. To provide that discharges may is-
sue only from a court-martial will mean a long period of time be-
tween initiation of the action and actual discharge. In the military
view, it will negate the value of the discharge.4 0
To the extent that these arguments support the military's con-
tentions that it must be permitted to administratively discharge
"undesirables" and that such discharges cannot or should not al-
ways be based on misconduct cognizable under the Uniform Code,
they are equally persuasive in showing that there is little differ-
ence in the breadth of inquiry of a court-martial and an adminis-
trative board, and that both occasion similar damaging conse-
quences. Given this, the services cannot avoid the constitu-
tional mandate requiring due process simply by calling the process
"administrative," when its real function is to try issues of fact and
impose punishment for wrong-doing.
S. 2247, which I introduced in the last session of Congress, at-
tempts to insure that the guarantees of due process are incorpo-
rated in the military's administrative procedings, first, by defining
what may be considered by the administrative board and, secondly,
by insuring that what is considered by the board is heard in ac-
cordance with traditional notions of due process. The remainder of
this article will deal with how S. 2247 and the Bennett bill, H.R.
10422, both now pending in the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, attempt to deal with these problems.
THE ADMmnSTRATE DISCHARGE BILlS
Limitations on Conduct Considered by Administrative Boards
S. 2247 restricts undesirable discharges to cases in which the
40. 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 5915.
serviceman has perpetrated a serious act of misconduct which
was tried by other than a military tribunal, and to cases where the
serviceman has demonstrated a "pattern" of misconduct or failure
of performance, whether or not the repeated conduct was adjudi-
cated by a civil or military tribunal.
By providing for administrative discharges for cases involving
serious misconduct tried by civilian authorities, 41 whether the con-
duct is cognizable under the Uniform Code or not, the bill recog-
nizes the military's contention that it must have a means of
discharging those committing serious acts of misconduct where
those acts are tried by civilian authorities. This avoids the double
jeopardy issue which is raised if discharges were only to issue as a
result of courts-martial. The provision has the added advantage of
insuring that the misconduct was adjudicated in a procedural
setting which accorded due process. It would be the province of
the military administrative board to decide only if the undesir-
able discharge is warranted.
The bill also limits the administrative board's consideration to
"patterns" of conduct as opposed to single acts of misconduct. It
provides that no administrative discharge will issue for an act of
misconduct which constitutes an offense under the Uniform
Code (except those tried by civilian authorities).42 On the other
hand, it provides that administrative discharges may issue for
unfitness on grounds of (1) frequent involvement of a discreditable
nature with civil or armed force authorities, (2) sexual perversion,
(3) an established pattern for shirking official duties and respon-
sibilities, and (4) an established pattern showing dishonorable fail-
ure to pay debts or to contribute adequate support to dependents,
or failure to comply with orders, decrees, or judgments of a civil
court concerning support of dependents.
43
These provisions should be read as complementary rather than
contradictory. They seek to do three things. First, they seek to
insure that commanders will not be able to avoid bringing charges
under the Code to punish misconduct. This means that service-
men will be entitled to all of the due process guarantees which a
courts-martial offers, and will not be subject to a punishment (dis-
charge) harsher than what a court-martial might give. Secondly,
they recognize the military's view that there must be some means
of getting rid of those servicemen who demonstrate their unfit-
ness for military service by repeated misconduct or failure to per-
41. S. 2247, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 964(c) (1971).
42. Id. § 944(b).
43. Id. § 964(c).
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form. Thirdly, they implicitly recognize that all misconduct can-
not or should not be brought under the Code, since they allow acts
of misconduct which establish a "pattern" of behavior to be consid-
ered by the administrative board.
Since the bill was first introduced as Title I of the proposed om-
nibus Military Justice Act of 1967, it has been reviewed by a num-
ber of experts in military law. Those reviews have raised a num-
ber of questions which remain to be resolved in any future hear-
ings on the bill. For instance, the question of who decides whether
certain conduct contributes to a pattern or stands alone to be proc-
essed under the Code is unanswered by the bill. The command-
ing officer must obviously make this determination initially. But
should the serviceman be able to raise such an objection to an ad-
ministrative board? If so, who should rule on the matter?4 4
Further problems are posed initially to the commander, and
could subsequently be posed to a board, by the relative vagueness
of the grounds specified in the bill upon which the discharge must
be brought. The phrase "frequent involvement of a discreditable
nature," for instance, must at the very least mean convictions in
military and civilian courts, e.g., for offenses less serious than those
which provide for one year imprisonment or a punitive discharge.
But should it also include non-judicial punishment? Letters of
reprimand? Oral reprimands? Traffic tickets?
The phrase "sexual perversion" also offers semantic difficulty
to the conscientious commander or the administrative board. Does
it mean one act of sexual perversion or a pattern of conduct which
establishes a condition of sexual perversion? And what is sexual
perversion in the first place?
Although these terms are taken from existing service regulations
and presumably incorporate the practice which has developed over
the years, the questions illustrate areas for further legislative per-
fecting. However, the basic objectives sought by these provisions
of the bill, which represent a balance between operational effi-
ciency and the protection of the serviceman's interests, are none-
theless valid.
44. Section 946 of the bill provides for the detail of a legal advisor to the
administrative board who would make such a determination. The role of
the advisor will be discussed in detail later in this article.
It is to be noted that the Bennett bill, H.R. 10422, makes no at-
tempt to define what kinds of conduct represent an appropriate
basis for convening an administrative board. On the contrary, it
provides that in four specific situations misconduct automatically
requires undesirable discharge-the respondent is entitled to no
hearing whatsoever.45 In my opinion, these provisions are unwise,
and may well be unconstitutional since the basic right to a hearing
is summarily denied. S. 2247, in each of these cases, would require
a board to determine whether the circumstances, however griev-
ous, justified an undesirable discharge.
Due Process in the Administrative Proceeding
In addition to limiting the type of misconduct which can be used
as a basis for convening the administrative board, S. 2247 also pre-
scribes procedures which seek to incorporate many of the tradi-
tional features of due process into the administrative proceeding.
To a considerable extent it merely incorporates into statutory lan-
guage procedural requirements already provided by regulations of
the services. Defense Department regulations, for instance, already
provide that a respondent appearing before an administrative board
has the right to be represented by the counsel of his choice, to
submit any sort of statement in his behalf, to question any wit-
nesses who are present, and to remain silent if he chooses. Evi-
dence is admissible if reasonably relevant, competent, and ma-
terial.46 Beyond this, however, other rights of procedural due proc-
ess rest precariously upon the judicial knowledge and integrity
of the board, which in the vast majority of cases is composed of
officers with little or no training in law.
Rights Prior to Hearing:
All branches of service now provide that notice of a forthcoming
board hearing be given the respondent.47 The Bennett bill pro-
vides only that the notice be "reasonable" and that it state the
grounds upon which the proposed discharge is based.48 S. 2247
provides that notice of a hearing will be given at least 15 days in
advance and that the notice must include the nature of the hear-
ing, a statement of the allegations and evidence against the respon-
45. RR. 10422, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1161(a) (3-6) (1971).
46. DoD Directive 1332.14, § IX(c) (1965).
47. Army Regulation 635-212, § 17; Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual,
Part C, § C-10311(4); Air Force Manual 39-12, § D(1-25c); Coast Guard
Personnel Manual, § 12-B-14 (a).
48. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161 (b) (1971).
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dent, the applicable law, a statement of his rights before the board,
and the possible actions which may be taken by the board.49
S. 2247 also has a special provision for notification of the parents of
respondent if he is under 21, or for any other reason is unable to
appreciate the nature of the proceedings against him.50 This
provision would be an important safeguard against an imprudent
waiver of the board proceeding in favor of an immediate discharge.
It is not uncommon for young, immature servicemen who are dis-
satisfied with their present assignment to seek administrative dis-
charge to escape their immediate situation without regard for the
consequences in ensuing years. In many cases, the immature serv-
iceman is incapable of appreciating his predicament and is easily
persuaded to waive his rights and accept a discharge which will
be detrimental to him for the rest of his life. Even the advice
of a JAG officer is often perfunctory and has little impact on the
young serviceman's decision. This safeguard against improvident
waiver of rights is worth the small clerical act it would require.
Under the Defense Department regulations, the respondent, hav-
ing been notified of the board hearing and having consulted with
counsel, may waive his rights to a hearing and accept a discharge
in lieu of the board proceeding." This provision is carried over in
both of the proposed bills.5 2 S. 2247, however, provides in addition
that no waiver can be made within 24 hours of the notice of the
hearing, and that the waiver may be rejected by the convening au-
thority if he considers it improvident. It furthermore provides
that where the hearing is waived, the ensuing discharge cannot be
an undesirable one, unless the board action would have supported
it. These are additional safeguards against improvident waivers
of rights.
Under present procedures, oral and written depositions may be
obtained with the permission of the convening authority for use
by the board.5 3 There are no formal procedures, however, which
apply specifically to depositions for administrative boards. Pre-
sumably, the requirements may be less stringent than those used at
49. S. 2247, supra note 41, § 952.
50. Id. § 953.
51. DoD Directive 1332.14, § VIII(D) (1965).
52. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161(a) (2); S. 2247, supra note 41,
§ 955 (c).
53. DoD Directive 1332.14, § IX(C) (4) (1965).
courts-martial, since the evidentiary requirements themselves are
less stringent.
Depositions are not a commonly used device at administrative
proceedings primarily because the boards allow ex parte state-
ments to be admitted into evidence. Why go through getting both
sides together to question a witness who will be unavailable at the
hearing, when one side may simply introduce his uncontested
statement if it so desires? S. 2247 prohibits the use of ex parte
statements altogether, thus making the deposition a much more
important device in the administrative setting.
S. 2247 provides for the taking and use of oral and written
depositions by the administrative board, forbidden only for good
cause, as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. 4  The Bennett
bill provides only that the secretaries of each branch of service
will prescribe regulations to govern the taking and use of deposi-
tions.55
The liberal use of depositions to preserve or discover evidence
comports with the practice in federal courts and administrative
agencies. 5 6 There is perhaps an even greater need for such a de-
vice to preserve evidence in a military setting since servicemen
are continually subject to transfer and termination. Use of depo-
sitions should reduce the number of personnel on administrative
hold.
At present, administrative boards do not have the power to sub-
poena witnesses and real evidence. They may invite a witness to
attend if he is reasonably available and his testimony materially
adds to the case.57 Civilian witnesses cannot be compelled to at-
tend at all and military witnesses appear only if their commander
permits. Both proposed bills provide the administrative board
with subpoena power.58 They provide that both sides will have
equal access to subpoenas, and that the provision will be imple-
mented by regulation of the services.
The objection of the military to such a provision in the past has
been that the respondent could block prompt administrative action
by requesting numerous unnecessary witnesses or documents to de-
54. S. 2247, supra note 41, § 960.
55. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161(a).
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a), and FED. R. CRm. P. 15(a). See also,
16 C.F.R. 3.33(a) and 18 C.F.R. 124(a), (c), as examples of liberal deposi-
tion procedures in federal agencies.
57. Do) Directive 1332.14, § IX(c) (3) (1965).
58. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161(b) (2); S. 2247, supra note 41, § 960
(a).
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lay the proceeding. The fact that the implementation of the sub-
poena rules would be left to the services, which thereby implicitly
allows them to require a showing of necessity in order to obtain a
subpoena, has caused the military to drop an objection"9 which
was not well founded in the first place.
The subpoena and deposition provisions together assure the re-
spondent of a means of obtaining and preserving evidence in his
favor as well as discovering that lodged against him.
Rights at the Administrative Hearing:
Both bills provide that the respondent has the right to present
evidence in his own behalf, to examine witnesses and all docu-
mentary evidence presented to the board, and to remain silent if
he so chooses.6° He also has the right to be represented by legal
counsel of his choice. These rights are largely accorded by present
regulations,0' and thus their incorporation in statute should occa-
sion no opposition from the services.
The bills also provide that rules of evidence in administrative
discharge procedures will be drawn and reported to the Congress.
S. 2247 provides that the Secretary of Defense will prescribe such
regulations but specifies that the evidence admitted must be rele-
vant, material, and probative. 62 The only change this represents
in the present rule is the addition of the word "probative." 63 The
bill goes further by prohibiting four specific uses of certain evi-
dence regardless of their relevancy, materiality, or probative value.
The first limitation is a restriction of evidence considered by a
board to those actions which took place three years prior to the
date the board was convened, or from the date of the current en-
listment or tour of duty, whichever is longer.64 The limitation is
59. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5854. Statement of Maj. Gen. Leo E.
Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel
Policy: "The Department of Defense strongly favors empowering boards
with what amounts to subpoena power."
60. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161(c); S. 2247, supra note 41, § 952.
61. DoD Directive 1332.14, Sec. IX(C) (1965). Army Regulation 635-212,
Sec. 17(c); Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, Part C, § C-10311 (5); Air
Force Manual 39-12, § 3-6 (c).
62. S. 2247, supra note 41, § 959 (d).
63. DoD Directive 1332.14, § IX(B) (1965).
64. S. 2247, supra note 41, § 959 (a).
thought necessary to protect the serviceman from having to defend
himself against actions which occurred far in the past. It is
based on the requirement presently contained in service regula-
tions that the character of an administrative discharge may be
determined only on the serviceman's record during the current en-
listment. Since an administrative discharge is presumably based
on repeated conduct which establishes a pattern or condition, such
a pattern or condition should be established over a defined period
of time. Otherwise, it should not be the basis for discharge.
The second limitation complements the first. It provides that
misconduct occurring in a previous enlistment or tour of duty may
be considered if the second enlistment or tour of duty was fraudu-
lently obtained. 5
The third limitation bars the admission of evidence relating to
acts for which the respondent has been acquitted or cannot be
tried again by reason of former jeopardy1 6 The purpose of the
provision is simply to prevent the services from attempting to sep-
arate servicemen administratively on the same grounds as an un-
successful court-martial. In the past, the subcommittee has seen
numerous instances in which a commander has ordered successive
administrative board hearings in a determined effort to separate a
serviceman. This provision is designed to guard against such pat-
ent abuses of the discharge process.
The last prohibition has three features: (1) no information ad-
verse to the respondent may be presented to a board over objection
unless the respondent has had an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the source of the information; (2) no investigative
report may be presented unless the respondent has an opportunity
to cross-examine the person making the report and has an oppor-
tunity to rebut; and (3) no classified information can be presented
unless first released to the respondent.67 These provisions insure
that the respondent will have ample opportunity to confront and
rebut all adverse evidence presented to a board. It applies the
simple justice of the sixth amendment.
These proposals effectively eliminate all adverse hearsay and ex
parte statements from consideration by the board. They have
been criticized as "too severe" because the military may be unable
to locate the person who made the statement or, if out of the serv-
ice, he could not be compelled to appear.0 8 Furthermore, it is ar-
65. Id.
66. Id. § 959(b).
67. Id. § 959(d).
68. Lane, Evidence and the Administrative Discharge Board, 55 MmI. L.
REv. 105 (1972).
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gued, the provision would only encourage delay on the part of the
respondent in hopes that certain evidence would not be available.6 9
The arguments may have some surface merit, but they do not
account for certain factors peculiar to the administrative setting.
Allowing hearsay and ex parte statements does not give a respon-
dent fair opportunity to rebut the evidence against him. It raises
due process issues because of the consequent denial of the right of
confrontation and cross-examination. What is worse, the present
rules encourage the presentation of such evidence by the mili-
tary. One alternative which has been suggested is to allow only
hearsay which would be admissible in a court-martial.7 0 But this
would require a highly technical knowledge of the law of evi-
dence and would necessitate a legally qualified representative to
the board to make such determinations. It may also lead to the
necessity for legally qualified advocates on both sides to argue the
evidentiary points. Perhaps a rule which allows for the admission
of hearsay and ex parte statements but which provides that the de-
cision of the administrative board cannot be based solely upon
them is a preferable alternative.71 But this too would be a mean-
ingless protection if the board's decision were not subjected to
review by a legally-qualified officer or review board, which now
does not exist.
The use of hearsay and ex parte statements of any type is less
important in an administrative discharge proceeding than in a
court-martial and it poses even more of a potential injustice.
Misconduct which establishes a pattern or condition will often
have been adjudicated in a prior proceeding,7 2 such as a court-
martial, civil trial, or non-judicial punishment. In these cases,
extraneous evidence relating to other acts will often simply not be
required. In cases where the discharge is not predicated upon
prior proceedings, there is typically no way to rebut hearsay alle-
gations other than with simple denials. There is no means of offer-
ing contradictory proof. For example, allegations of homosexual
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. This standard is incorporated into the administrative procedures
statute of California. CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 11513 (c) (West 1966).
72. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 86. Maj. Gem Kenneth 3. Hodson,
then Assisant Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, called
this the "typical" case.
acts performed in private cannot be disproved, since there are
typically no witnesses other than the participants and no tangible
evidence of the act. Similarly, allegations of a failure to pay just
debts are difficult to disprove since only the parties typically
have knowledge of the transaction. Allowing hearsay and ex parte
allegations which the respondent cannot rebut with proof or cast
doubt upon by questioning his accuser, leaves him at the mercy of
anonymous accusers, rumors and vague accusations. Given the dif-
ficulties presented by allowing hearsay and ex parte statements
under some limitations, it is preferable to simply rule out such
evidence altogether and force the military to present its case in
testimony or by deposition.
In addition to the evidentiary restrictions specified in S. 2247,
there are other compelling limitations which, if not included in the
statute, should be included in service regulations. For example, no
evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure should be admis-
sible before an administrative board. The Supreme Court has al-
ready applied this principle to the administrative arena7 3 and it
should be applied as well to administrative discharge boards. Dis-
charge regulations now allow such evidence to be admitted and
this often induces the commander to elect to separate administra-
tively because he knows that a conviction by court-martial cannot
be obtained with illegal evidence. The commander who seizes
drugs or contraband illegally should not be able to avoid the stric-
tures of the fourth amendment simply by a resort to the admin-
istrative board. Not only does this violate fair play and simple
justice but it subverts the integrity of the court-martial as well.
A similar problem is presented by the practice of admitting
into evidence self-incriminating statements obtained in violation of
Article 31 and the fifth amendment. This practice has been justi-
fied on the basis that Article 31 and the fifth amendment guar-
antee apply specifically to "criminal" trials alone.74 This may be
technically true, but this argument avoids the reality of a board
proceeding which indeed pronounces a judgment on acts of miscon-
duct. To adopt a restriction on self-incriminating statements in
board proceedings would bring them in line with an important
constitutional precept.
A third restriction which deserves consideration is the prohibition
of evidence which relates to conduct which is not "service-con-
73. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
74. Judge Advocate General of the Army Opinion, 196713727, 31 March
1967.
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nected." The case of O'Callahan v. Parker75 established the princi-
ple that the military cannot try a man for misconduct which is
not "service-connected." Can he nonetheless be discharged for
such conduct? There is no disagreement that the services can and
should use civil convictions as a basis for discharge, but the in-
troduction of evidence relating to conduct not connected with the
service presents a more compelling question. S. 2247 does not pro-
vide such a limitation and, in fact, provides that boards may con-
sider conduct which took place within three years prior to the con-
vening of the board. This may well mean that conduct could be
considered which took place prior to the serviceman's entry into
active duty.
Whatever evidentiary restrictions are incorporated into statute or
regulation, there must be some authority or some body to determine
if proposed evidence violates these standards. Both bills answer this
need by providing for the appointment of a legal advisor to the
administrative board to rule on such questions. The Bennett bill
makes such appointment mandatory except where physical exigen-
cies do not permit.76  S. 2247 provides that the appointment is
mandatory when requested by the respondent or the board, un-
less compelling reasons for refusing the request are present. Other-
wise, the appointment is discretionary with the convening author-
ity. 7
The military was initially opposed to the concept of a legal ad-
visor because it would further drain the supply of legal officers.
They contended that the right to legal representation offered the
respondent adequate protection at the hearing.78 At the House
hearing on the Bennett bill, however, the Defense Department
dropped its opposition and affirmatively proposed such a provi-
sion.79 The House committee added the provision for a legal
advisor to the original bill after the hearings were completed.80
There may indeed be cases where there are no evidentiary ques-
tions, no motions, no challenges, and no other legal issues for a legal
75. 395 U.S. 258 (1965).
76. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161(d).
77. S. 2247, supra note 41, at § 946.
78. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 357.
79. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5854.
80. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161(d).
advisor to rule upon. This situation may well be obvious prior to
the hearing. The convening authority, under the provisions of S.
2247, may thus refuse a request for the appointment of a legal
advisor. In this sense, S. 2247 actually comes closer than the Ben-
nett bill in limiting the requirement for legally qualified personnel
for detail to board proceedings to those instances in which one is
necessary.
Post Hearing Rights:
Under present regulations, the findings and recommendations of
an administrative board are typically sent through the chain of
command to the discharge authority, who may or may not follow
the board's recommendation and who may or may not receive a
legal opinion on the validity of the board proceeding.,,
The pending bills both provide for some type of review of the
board's determination before final action is taken by the discharge
authority. The Bennett bill provides that the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of each service will establish review boards to which the
serviceman may appeal the board's decision.8 2 S. 2247 provides
that the Secretary of Defense will provide by regulation that all
administrative board decisions recommending a less than honor-
able discharge be subject to a mandatory review for legal suffi-
ciency. It further provides that the Court of Military Appeals
will establish grounds for discretionary appeal of administrative
decisions.8 3 Both bills provide that a decision on review may not
be less favorable than that adjudged by the administrative board.
Until the 1971 hearings, the military had consistently opposed
any review of administrative board decisions on the grounds that
there already exist instrumentalities to review discharges, namely,
the Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of Military
Records found in each branch of service. 8" The difficulty with this
argument was that review took place after the serviceman had
been discharged, and often took as long as two years after applica-
tion for review was filed. What is more, these boards did not
have the power of reinstatement and could not give complete
relief even in clear cases of improper discharges.
81. DoD Directive 1332.14, § IX(D) (1965); Army Regulation 635-212,
§ 13-15; Air Force Manual 39-12, § 2-18. The Navy and Coast Guard re-
quire review of all administrative discharges by the Chief of Naval Per-
sonnel and the Coast Guard Commandant, respectively. Bureau of Naval
Personnel Manual, Part C, § C-10313A; Coast Guard Personnel Manual,
§ 12-B-16.
82. H.R. 10422, supra note 45, § 1161 (e).
83. S. 2247, supra note 41, § 966.
84. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 89.
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The military claimed that review would only delay the discharge
still longer and further reduce its value as a personnel tool. 5
They further argued that appeals of administrative decisions should
be kept out of the judicial sector of the military which has little
knowledge of the administrative area and which has too bur-
densome a workload without this added responsibility.80
The military has now dropped its opposition to review of admin-
istrative board decisions by legally-qualified personnel.8 7 It has
in fact supported a proposal to establish three-man boards which
would review board decisions as a matter of law. The review
board under the Defense Department's proposal would be re-
stricted to consideration of the verbatim record of the hearing
and written legal arguments, but may, in its discretion, require
a hearing. The military's new approach to this issue is to be ap-
plauded. While some delay in obtaining the discharge is inevita-
ble, the delay need not be any longer than what is now often re-
quired for review by the staff judge advocate of the convening au-
thority or higher levels of command where it is in fact performed.
Pre-discharge review provides additional safeguards for the respon-
dent and assures that the procedures established by regulation
and statute will be conscientiously observed.
The military still continues to balk at the judicial review of ad-
ministrative boards' actions, even on a discretionary basis, pro-
vided for in S. 2247. They react negatively to the additional time
required for such review88 and the injection of the administrative
proceeding into the criminal justice structure which they claim
neither has the time nor the expertise to deal with such problems.89
The latter objection is not convincing in light of the testimony of
Chief Judge Quinn of the Court of Military Appeals who candidly
stated at the 1966 hearings that the workload of the court was not
heavy, and that the court possessed sufficient expertise-especially
in regard to issues of due process-to consider appeals from a re-
view board's decisions.90
85. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5925-26.
86. 1966 Hearings, supra. note 5, at 89.
87. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5837.
88. Id. at 5915.
89. Id. at 5910.
90. 1966 Hearings, supra note 5, at 283-87.
Court of Military Appeals review will involve further delay of
the discharge. But the time could be shortened by providing
that petition for discretionary review be made first to an inter-
mediate Court of Military Review or the boards established under
S. 2247 or the Bennett bill rather than directly to the Court of
Military Appeals.
The discretionary nature of the review authorized by S. 2247 is
designed to minimize the number of cases which run the entire
appellate process. Only those cases will be chosen which present
novel or compelling issues of law. It is common knowledge that
the court has always handled its caseload expeditiously and sel-
dom has a backlog.
The Court of Military Appeals review enables a superior mili-
tary court of distinguished quality and unquestioned integrity to
ensure that the rules of all the services comport with the statutory
requirements and that the board hearings are conducted according
to applicable law. Only by means of such an ultimate judicial re-
view can we assure the necessary conformity contemplated by the
Department of Defense directives and the statutory reforms. Re-
view by the Court of Military Appeals would go far to assure
servicemen and the general public alike that the administrative
discharge process is indeed operated fairly and justly. It would
obviate the need for special injunctive intervention by federal
courts into the administrative process and do much to restore the
often tarnished reputation of the administrative discharge process.
While S. 2247 does not specifically require review by "legally-quali-
fied" personnel at the intermediate stage, it does provide that the
board's decision will be reviewed for legal sufficiency. Review by
legally-qualified personnel is therefore implied but not obligatory.
At some stage, and certainly at the final stage, undesirable dis-
charges must be subject to review by a fully competent judicial
body. Absent this, there is the danger that all the protections os-
tensibly granted by statute and regulation may be lost in practice.
CONCLUSION
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Thomas D.
Morris made the following statement in his testimony before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1966:
The Department of Defense, no less than this committee, holds
that military service in the Armed Forces of the Nation should
not abridge or deprive any American citizen of the substance of
constitutional rights to which he would otherwise be entitled as
a private citizen, insofar as this is compatible with his status as
a member of the Armed 'Forces. We further recognize that our
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system of military justice must be responsive to the special condi-
tions of current military service as well as to constitutional es-
sentials. Our administrative discharge and separation procedures
likewise should be guided by the sense of justice and fairplay
that every American has a right to expect from his Government.91
It is this very sense of "justice and fair play," tempered by the
recognized necessity for a strong and efficient military, which S.
2247 attempts to bring to an area which has been riddled with
abuse and inconsistency. The military has demonstrated, if at times
reluctantly, that it is amenable to change in the interests of pro-
tecting the constitutional rights of its members. It is time now
for the Congress to at last take the initiative to insure that the
guarantees of the Constitution are not slighted by the military
administrative discharge procedure.
91. Id. at 12.
